Faculty

Zhiwei Gu
Assistant Professor
philosophy of mind, especially the philosophy of perception
E-mail:
Contact information:
Research Areas

Research Interests

I work in the philosophy of mind, especially the philosophy of perception. I have attempted to defend naïve realism about perception against various attacks based on illusion and hallucination. My current research focuses on the compatibility between naïve realism and cognitive theories theory about perception. I’m also interested in and working on the philosophy of language, fictional characters, and Wittgenstein.



Research Areas

Research Interests

I work in the philosophy of mind, especially the philosophy of perception. I have attempted to defend naïve realism about perception against various attacks based on illusion and hallucination. My current research focuses on the compatibility between naïve realism and cognitive theories theory about perception. I’m also interested in and working on the philosophy of language, fictional characters, and Wittgenstein.



Research Areas

Peer-Reviewed Publications

1. Ivanov, Ivan V & Gu, Zhiwei (2025). Naïve Realist Approaches to Hallucination. Monthly Journal of Philosophy and Culture. 610 (3):149-166.

2. Gu, Zhiwei (2025). A Tropist Relational Account of Hallucinations. Ratio 38 (2):110-117.

3. Gu, Z. (2024). The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance. Acta Analytica, 39, 273-294.

4. Gu, Z. (2022). Propositional Intentionalism and the Argument from Accuracy. Philosophia, 51, 697-715.

5. Gu, Z. (2021). The Time-Lag Argument and Simultaneity. Synthese, 199, 11231-11248.

6. Gu, Z. (2020). The Argument from Illusion and the Uniqueness Assumption. Journal of Human Cognition, 4(2).

7. Gu, Z. (2022). Chalmers' Elea Argument and Virtualism (in Chinese). Studies in Dialectics of Nature.

Funded Research Projects

· China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2023, Project M730716): Direct Realism under the Bayesian Brain Hypothesis

· China Social Science Foundation (2023): Various Challenges in the Philosophy of Perception and the Naïve Realist Solution