
Education
University of Massachusetts Amherst Amherst, MA, USA
Ph.D. in Philosophy February 2021
• Dissertation: Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness?. Advisor: Joseph Levine
• Areas of Specialization: philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive sciences
University of Massachusetts Amherst Amherst, MA, USA
M.A. Philosophy February 2017
Fudan University Shanghai, China
B.A. Philosophy June 2011
Working experiences
Fudan University Shanghai, China
Assistant Professor, School of Philosophy December 2021 - present
Smith College Northampton, MA, USA
Associate Instructor (Logic Program) September-December 2018, 2019
Smith College Northampton, MA, USA
Instructor (Philosophy Department) September-December 2019
University of Massachusetts Amherst Amherst, MA, USA
Graduate Teaching Associate September 2015-July 2020
University of Massachusetts Amherst Amherst, MA, USA
Graduate Teaching Assistant September 2013-May 2015
Selected Papers
• “The Ontological Status of Consciousness: From Panpsychism to Real Psychism” (意识的本体论地位——如何从“泛心”回归“真心”). Journal of Dialectics of Nature(自然辩证法通讯) (forthcoming).
• “Scientific Theories of Consciousness and Introspection” (意识的科学理论与内省——内省报告的理论角色与局限). Philosophical Analysis (哲学分析) (2025). 16(2), 142-155.
• “Ignorance and Prospect in Russellian Monism” (罗素式一元论的无知与前途). Science Economy Society (科学·经济·社会) (2024). 42(5), 41-54.
• “Of ‘qualia’ and ‘what it is like’”. Journal of Human Cognition (2024). 8(1), 22-34.
• “Conceptual Speculation in Contemporary Panpsychism” (当代泛心论的概念玄想). Cognitive Science (认知科学) (2023). 7(2), 5-21.
• “Dimensions of Thinking about Consciousness and the Origins of Dualistic Intuition” (思考意识的维度与二元论直觉的起源). Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition)(复旦学报(社会科学版)) (2023). 65(6), 92-99.
• “ ‘What it is like’ ”. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (2022). doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2161069
• “Of Integrated Information Theory: A Philosophical Evaluation”. Philosophical Psychology (2020). 33(3), 442-468. doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1695044
• “On Chalmers on the Meta-problem”. Journal of Consciousness Studies (2020). 27(5-6), 91-98.
Selected Presentations
• “The Second-Person Perspective and Consciousness Studies” (Poster). July 2024, The 27thAnnual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC)
• “On the Antipathetic Fallacy in Phenomenal Thoughts” (Poster). June 2019, The 23rd Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC)
• “Russellian Monism, Hylomorphism, and the Mystery of Consciousness” (Poster). January 2019, American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division
• “Integrated Information Theory: A Philosophical Evaluation” (Poster). June 2017, The 21st Annual Meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC)
• “The Combination Problem and the Phenomenal Bond”. March 2017, American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division
Current Research interests
• A book project criticizing panpsychism as a metaphysical approach to consciousness that doesn’t offer fruitful understanding of the phenomenon.
• Studies in how we think about consciousness, including how phenomenal concepts of particular qualities work, and how concepts of consciousness relate to the recognition of moral status.
• Studies concerning the nature of the “explanatory gap” via reflections on explanation and language use
• Studies concerning conceptions of consciousness in recent scientific theories of consciousness, such as IIT, GWT, and HOT.
Professional Services
Referee for Cognitive Science, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Theoria, Acta Analytica, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Mind and Matter, Chinese Philosophical Review (哲学评鉴).